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TAXATION-FEDERAL INCOME TAX-SECRET WITHDRAWALS OF CoRPORATE
RECEIPTS BY STOCKHOLDER AS INCOME IN ABSENCE OF SURPLUS-As sole stockholder of the Robbins Tire and Rubber Company, the defendant managed
and controlle'd the affairs of the corporation. Over a period of years he
intercepted th~ company's receipts from several of its large customers and
diverted them to his own use. No entries of such receipts were made on
the books of the company, nor was any tax paid on them. Defendant was
convicted for attempted evasion of his personal income tax on these funds. 1
On appeal, ·he_ld, affirmed. Taxation is concerned with actual command
over property: If does not matter fvhether defendant got the funds as a
iegal distribution of corporate property or took them fraudulently, since
he assumed command and dominion over the cash and received economic
gain therefrom. Davis v. United States, (6th Cir. 1955) 226 F. (2d) 331,
c;ert. de:n,.. 350 U.S. 965 (1956).
'
The crucial question involved is whether these withdrawals constituted
income to the defendant. A taxpayer receives income when he obtains
control over property to the extent that he derives readily realizable economic

1 The government proved only that defendant had taken from the gross receipts
of the corporation. The taxpayer argued that it had failed to prove that any tax
liability arose from these transactions, since there was no showing that the CO,!llpany had
any surplus in the years in question from which dividends could be paid.
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value from it "even though it may have been obtained by fraud and his
freedom to use it may be assailable by someone with a better title to it." 2
This rule would seem to apply to the funds received by the defendant in
the principal case. The theory of the government, which the court adopts,
was that the funds are fraudulent, unrecorded diversions from the corporation which ar.e taxable as income under United States v. Rutkin.3 Commissioner v. Wilcox,4 which held that an embezzler's gain was not taxable
income, is distinguished on the ground that defendant could not embezzle
the funds of his wholly-owned corporation but merely took from himself
under a different name. 5 Under this view, the determination that the
case is controlled by the Rutkin decision rather than. Commissioner v.
Wilcox seems proper. 6 When a sole stockholder of a corporation takes the
funds of the corporation secretly, pursuant to a- plan of "covering his
tracks" and avoiding any record of the transaction, the funds have the
character of income as prescribed in the Rutkin case. The defendant in
the principal case relied on specific provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code to the effect that corporate distributions, other than dividends, are
not taxable income but serve to reduce the basis of the taxpayer's stock. 7
He claimed that his actions constituted distributions by the company,8
and there is some support for this position.9 Congress has clearly divided
2 Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952), holding that funds received by
extortion were taxable as income. See also Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930); Burnet
v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670 (1933).
s Note 2 supra.
4 327 U.S. 404 (1946). The court held that the test of taxable income is twofold:
(l) a claim of right to the funds, and (2) the absence of a definite, unconditional obligation to repay.
5 Ka1:1-n v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1953) 210 F. (2d) 247, cert. den. 347 U.S. 967
(1954), held that receipts taken by a president of a corporation for his personal use
were income. The Wilcox case was distinguished on the fact that the taxpayer was a
large stockholder and not merely an employee. The court felt that the possibility that
a sole owner could embezzle the funds of bis own corporation under local law should
not determine tax liability.
6 The Wilcox case was severely limited by the Rutkin case, note 2 supra, which
expressly limited it to its facts (embezzlement). Subsequent cases have left considerable
doubt as to the exact status of the ·wncox decision. See Kann v. Commissioner, note 5
supra. The same view was taken in United Mercantile Agencies Inc. v. Commissioner,
23 T.C. 1105 (1955). See also Briggs v. United States, (4th Cir. 1954) 214 F. (2d) 699,
<;ert. den. 348, U.S. 864 (1954); l\farienfield v. United States, (8th Cir. 1954) 214 F. (2d)
632, cert. den. 348 U.S. 865 (1954); Berra v. United States, (8th Cir. 1955) 221 F. (2d)
590. In United States v. Bruswitz, (2d Cir. 1955) 219 F. (2d) 59, cert. den. 349 U.S.
913 (1955), the court stated that the possession and control criterion was diametrically
opposed to the "claim of right" doctrine and that it was difficult to see what, if anything, remained of the Wilcox decision. Yet, the same court in Dix v. Commissioner,
(2d Cir. 1955) 223 F. (2d) 436, cert. den. 350 U.S. 894 (1955), followed the Wilcox case
where the president of a family corporation embezzled its funds. See Gelfand, "Wilcox
or Rutkin-Is the Fog Lifting?" 34 TAXES 109 (1956).
1 I.R.C., §§316 (a), 301 (c); I.R.C. (1939), §115 (d).
s A formal declaration of dividends is not necessary to constitute corporate distributions. Christopher v. Burnet, (D.C. Cir. 1931) 55 F. (2d) 527; Wiese v. Commissioner,
(8th Cir. 1938) 93 F. (2d) 921, cert. den. 304 U.S. 562 (1937). See note 6 supra.
9 Although the question has not been clearly raised heretofore, in Currier v. United

310

MICHIGAN' LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

corporate distributions into two categories-dividends and non-dividends.
The former are taxable as income while the latter are not taxed except
when they have exceeded the cost basis of the stock, at which time they
are taxed as gain from the sale of property. 10 In order to create a tax
liability, the distribution must have resulted in a dividend or a return of
capital in excess of cost basis.11 The position of the court appears to be
that section 301 properly applies only to conventional corporate distributions.12 Where money is taken pursuant to a scheme of total concealment,
it does not result in a distribution of the character referred to by section
301 but results in income by ·wrongful diversion of corporation funds.
The question, then, is one of degree_ This rule can be rather easily applied
to the extreme facts of the principal case, but future decisions must spell
out at what point the secret character of the transaction removes it from
the operation of section 301. The operation of such a rule should not be
exte~ded beyond the type of covert withdrawal involved in the principal

case.
Kenneth H. Haynie, S-Ed.

States, (1st Cir. 1948) 1~6 F. (2d) 346, the owner of 75% of the stock in a corporation
(his wife owned the remainder) took receipts of the company. Part of the money was
held taxable as a constructive dividend, the court holding that any further amounts
were a return of capital or money wrongfully taken_ See also United States v_ Augustine,
(3d Cir_ 1950) 185 F. (2d) 407, revd_ (3d Cir- 1951) 189 F. (2d) 587.
101.R.C., §301; I.R.C. (1939), §115 (d).
11 It is worthy of note that the holding of the Rutkin case, note 2 supra, was issued
in a different context. Since the test there adopted applies equally well to dividends
or capital returns, its utility in this area may be questioned.
. 12 The Shield Company v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 763 (1943); George M. Gross v.
Commissioner, 23 T.C. 756 (1955); Estate of Esther M. Stein, 25 T.C. No. 109 (1956).
See also Estate of Ida S. Godley v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 1082 (1953), revd. (3d Cir.
1954) 213 F. (2d) 529,

